Youngstown Daily Legal News

Supreme Court of Ohio: Offense classifications can be applied retroactively

JESSICA SHAMBAUGH
Special to the Legal News
Published: February 24, 2014

In an opinion released recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that a defendant may benefit from a decrease in an offense classification and corresponding penalty enacted after the commission of the alleged offense but prior to sentencing.

Lucious Taylor was indicted on theft charges after he allegedly stole $550 worth of cologne from a Sears store in July 2011.

His indictment defined his offense as a fifth-degree felony.

Prior to Taylor’s sentencing, however, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86, which amended several offense classifications.

Specifically, it stated that theft of property valued at less than $1,000 should be labeled a first-degree misdemeanor and reduced the maximum punishment for that offense.

Taylor ultimately pleaded no contest to the charges against him and the trial court convicted and sentenced him for a first-degree misdemeanor. The state appealed that decision to the 9th District Court of Appeals.

That appellate court reached a 2-1 decision in which the majority held that Taylor was properly sentenced, but ruled that he should have been convicted of a felony rather than a misdemeanor.

The district judges reasoned that the General Assembly had not made their amendments retroactive and the Ohio Revised Code only mandated that penalties apply retroactively and did not include a retroactive clause for offense classifications.

The appellate court certified the conflict with a 5th District Court of Appeals case and the high court accepted it for review.

Upon review, the justices first specified that R.C. 1.58(B) states that is a penalty for an offense is reduced prior to sentencing, the amended penalty should be imposed.

“The central position advanced by the state is that R.C. 1.58(B) refers to amendments to the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for an offense and does not refer to amendments to the classification or degree of an offense,” Justice Terrence O’Donnell wrote for the majority. “The flaw in that position, however, is that implicit in a decrease in the classification of an offense from a felony of the fifth degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree is a corresponding reduction in the penalty or punishment for that conduct.”

The 6-1 majority held that the real question presented by the case was if the amendments applied to Taylor.

It maintained that the General Assembly intended the reduction to apply because it ordered the reduction of the penalty, which could only be done by reducing the classification.

“In this case, Taylor had not been sentenced as of the date the amendments became effective and therefore pursuant to R.C. 1.58(B), the court had a duty to impose sentence in accord with the amended statutes.

“We therefore answer the certified conflict in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals,” O’Donnell wrote in conclusion.

Acting Chief Justice William Harsha, who sat for Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, and justices Paul Pfeifer, Judith Lanzinger, Sharon Kennedy and William O’Neill concurred.

In a separate opinion, Justice Judith French dissented from the majority.

“The central question before us is whether the classification level of an offense qualifies as a ‘penalty’ or ‘punishment’ to the offender, apart from any actual sentence the offender receives. Because the answer to this question is no, and because the majority largely avoids the issue, I must respectfully dissent,” French wrote.

She explained that the corresponding section of the Ohio Revised Code only mandated that shortened punishments or penalties be retroactively applied.

She asserted that the statute did not apply to reducing a criminal classification and ruled that Taylor should have been convicted of theft as a fifth-degree felony rather than as a first-degree misdemeanor.

“Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Taylor could not be convicted as a felon and sentenced as a misdemeanant. I disagree with the rationales supporting this conclusion,” she stated.

The case is cited State v. Taylor, 2014-Ohio-460.

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