Youngstown Daily Legal News

Court rules father who punched coach properly convicted and sentenced

ANNIE YAMSON
Special to the Legal News
Published: July 8, 2013

The 3rd District Court of Appeals recently sided with the Hardin County Court of Common pleas when it found that a defendant was properly sentenced to community control after he was found guilty of assault of school teacher, a fifth-degree felony.

Abraham Oates appealed the Hardin County decision, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that the community control condition barring him from attending any Kenton City Schools athletic events was overly broad and unnecessarily impinged on his liberty.

A grand jury indicted Oates on March 1, 2012 on one count of assault of a school teacher on school premises.

The indictment stemmed from a confrontation between Oates and his son’s basketball coach, Ryan Ludwig, after a basketball game that took place on Feb. 7, 2012.

According to case summary, Oates was upset that his son was not getting enough time on the court and ended up punching the middle school coach in the face.

Oates entered a plea of not guilty and, after a jury convicted him of the charge, he was sentenced to one year of community control.

Among the conditions of his sentence, Oates was ordered to have no contact with Ludwig and not to attend any of the school district’s athletic events.

Upon appeal, Oates first argued his constitutional rights were violated by his trial counsel’s failure to properly prepare for trial.

He believed his counsel should have requested a self-defense jury instruction, “despite trial counsel presenting the evidence in support of the self-defense claim,” Presiding Judge Vernon Preston stated in the opinion he wrote on behalf of the appellate court.

“Oates argues that, had the court given the jury a self-defense instruction, the jury ‘likely’ would have concluded that Oates acted in self-defense,” wrote Preston.

In order to show this his counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, Oates was required to “overcome the presumption that the counsel provided competent representation” and needed to show that his actions were not “trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment.”

“Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Preston explained. “Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance.”

The three-judge appellate panel determined that failure to request jury instructions is purely a matter of trial tactics and “will not be disturbed upon review.”

The panel also held that self-defense “is an affirmative defense, which means the burden of going forward is on the defendant who must prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence.”

In other words, to pursue the self-defense argument, Oates was not required to negate any of the state’s facts but rather, accept responsibility for the facts and prove why he was exempt from liability.

“To determine whether an instruction on self-defense is warranted, the trial court must determine whether the defendant had introduced sufficient evidence, which, if believed, would raise a question in the minds of reasonable men concerning the existence of such issue,” Preston wrote.

However, the court of appeals found self-defense was not the theory that Oates and his counsel pursued at trial.

The state called Ludwig as a witness at trial and he testified that Oates punched him in the face with a closed fist.

Instead of admitting the facts presented by the prosecution, a requirement for the pursuit of a self-defense theory, Oates attempted to negate the offense.

In fact, he testified that he never struck Ludwig at all: “The second time when he came back at me more aggressive, I felt like he was coming at me, as close as he was. I grabbed his hand. As I grabbed his hand, he pulled back and slapped himself in the head.”

Oates stated that if there was any type of physical contact, that is where it would have taken place.

In the eyes of the appellate court, Oates’ testimony was inconsistent with the concept of self-defense in which, “a defendant concedes that he had the purpose to commit the act, but asserts that he was justified in his actions.”

Preston found that a self-defense jury instruction would have been improper because Oates failed to present sufficient evidence to raise the defense.

“Trail counsel, therefore, did not act deficiently or unreasonably when he failed to request a self-defense instruction.”

The court also addressed Oates’ claim that the sanction barring him from attending any Kenton City Schools athletic events unnecessarily impinged on his liberty and was overbroad.

His argument hinged on the fact that the condition was not intended to prevent any future criminality because his son did not play for any other schools in the district and because there was no reason to believe that Oates would commit another crime in the future.

“We are not persuaded by Oates’ arguments,” wrote Preston, concluding that school premises and athletic events were the underlying themes of both the condition and the crime therefore, the sanction was reasonable.

The court rejected the argument that there was no reason to believe that Oates would commit another crime in the future.

“One of the goals of community control is ensuring good behavior,” wrote Preston. “Oates assaulted his son’s coach after a basketball game, and the community control condition is aimed at keeping Oates out of those situations and ensuring his good behavior.”

The appellate panel noted, as did the trial court, that Oates continued to express his displeasure with his son’s, and some other players’, lack of playing time even until his sentencing hearing.

“For these reasons,” the panel held. “The condition relates to conduct that is reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of community control.”

The court found no error on the trial court’s part that could have been considered prejudicial to Oates so it overruled both of the arguments he presented in his appeal and affirmed the judgment and sentencing of the Hardin County court.

Judges Stephen Shaw and Richard Rogers concurred.

The case is cited State v. Oates, 2013-Ohio-2609.

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